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While many contemporary philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of grace 
and freedom proposed by Luis de Molina (i.e., Molinism), fewer by far are familiar with that 
position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism).1 
Both share a 400-year-long and heavily fraught, complicated, intricate history. To avoid 
complexities of historical interpretation, I will broadly construe these positions in terms of 
occupying a certain logical space. The domain of this space results from a difficulty because 
Catholic theology accepts two sets of apparently conflicting claims about human freedom. On 
one hand, the tradition affirms human beings cannot perform a special subset of actions – call 
them “supernatural actions” – without God’s special causal help:  
“If anyone affirms that without the illumination and the inspiration of the Holy 
Spirit…through the strength of nature he can think anything good which pertains to the 
salvation of eternal life, as he should, or choose, or consent to salvation, that is to the 
evangelical proclamation, he is deceived by the heretical spirit, not understanding the 
voice of God speaking in the Gospel….”2 
On the other hand, a strong affirmation of freedom was formulated by the Catholic 
Church in opposition to versions of Calvinism or other theological traditions, holding instead that 
human beings have the freedom to resist or cooperate with God’s grace, even when acting under 
that grace. Famously, a view attributed to the Catholic theologian Cornelius Jansen was deemed 
heretical because his writings were taken to deny the power of the will to resist or obey grace; 
there are many such examples.3  
Considering the space of possible orthodox accounts of how these claims are compatible, 
two options developed among Catholic theologians. On the Molinist option, one opts to say that 
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God foreknows how humans will respond to grace in virtue of knowing counter-factual 
propositions about what that person would freely choose to do in non-actual situations, or 
‘counter-factuals of freedom.’ Then, God acts upon a creature4 in order to bring about their 
conversion, for example, by giving those helps (i.e., grace) that He can infallibly know will bring 
about their conversion; and the same goes for God bringing a person to perform any other 
supernatural act. As God’s grace brings about what a creature would themselves freely choose, 
the Molinist proposes, the apparently conflicting truths about human freedom and God’s grace 
are reconciled.  
The other option is Banezianism. Banezians broadly hold that God’s grace is intrinsically 
such it brings about human free decisions, using technical terminology (viz., ‘physical 
premotion’) to indicate that God’s grace is causally efficacious in achieving these results. They 
would contrast their position to the Molinist, claiming that Molinism holds that God’s grace 
brings about supernatural acts, such as conversion, only in virtue of being ‘extrinsically’ 
efficacious. This is to say that the grace God gives is not, by itself, causally efficacious in 
bringing about some such result. The Banezian, however, holds that God’s causal determination 
can directly bring about human free action without undermining their freedom. God’s manner of 
causing an action is not the same sort usually envisioned in philosophical debates about 
compatibilism, however, in which typically one thinks of a case where the initial state of the 
universe and fixed laws of nature casually determine one unique physical future. Instead, the 
Banezian argues, God can directly bring about properly free acts in His creatures, without 
necessitating or making those actions any less free, because God has unique causal power that 
nothing else has.5 
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Whereas a typical and prominent ‘grounding problem’ for Molinism involves how there 
can be counter-factual truths about freedom, and what grounds those truths, a typical problem for 
the Banezian position is that the view certainly looks like some version of theological 
compatibilism. It is uncontroversial that the Banezian is committed to a ‘strong’ concept of 
creaturely freedom, as that is a doctrinal commitment of Catholicism, but the aforementioned 
doctrinal condemnations were controversial texts in the disputes between Molinists and 
Banezians. On one hand, it is not uncontroversial that, for the Banezian, creatures can resist 
God’s grace. Molinists therefore appealed to such condemnations to argue that Banezianism was 
heretical. On the other hand, I refrain from saying that the Church requires ‘incompatiblism’ to 
be true, because there is great debate whether Thomas Aquinas’ own theory of grace or the 
interpretative tradition that I am calling Banezianism is correctly characterized as ‘libertarian’ or 
‘compatibilist.’6 Some Banezians straightforwardly bite the bullet of theological compatibilism.7  
For my purposes, it is unimportant to distinguish whether Aquinas or Banez is truly a 
‘compatibilist.’ While many are familiar with the aforementioned grounding problem for 
Molinism, what this paper argues is that Banezianism’s central problem is an analogate of the 
‘grounding problem’ for Molinism.8 The Banezian has the burden of explaining that in virtue of 
which it is true that a creature can do otherwise (e.g., resist God’s efficacious grace), much like 
the Molinist has a burden of showing what it is in virtue of which counter-factuals of freedom 
are true. My aim is to clarify this problem for the Banezian position generally and broadly. 
Moreover, this problem, as I will pose it in the context of one recent and prominent version of 
Banezianism, is unaffected by biting the bullet of theological compatibilism. 
Consider, for example, that – for the Banezian of the sort like Garrigou-Lagrange below – 
God is giving intrinsically different graces to people who cooperate with grace (such as a person 
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who makes an act of faith and love in God) and those who do not (e.g., a person who remains 
impenitent until death). A serious consequence of this view is that a person who sins has, by that 
very fact, not received the same kind of grace as a righteous person who does not sin. Given that 
the Banezian holds that God’s grace precedes creaturely free choice, God cannot be responding 
to human decisions (even counter-factually) in deciding who receives the efficacious graces and 
who does not. Instead, Banezians are clear that God chooses to give, or not give, efficacious 
grace to an individual, from eternity, and before knowing anything about what such a person 
would do. Yet, on the supposition that God were to choose not to give efficacious grace to a 
person, there is no possible world where that person can avoid sinning and, if God never chooses 
to give that person efficacious grace, going to hell. 
While one might naturally wonder about theodicy on a view where God denies some people 
the aid needed to save them from hell, the ‘big’ problem for the Banezian is ultimately one of 
coherence. The grounding problem for their view only requires certain claims about the power or 
ability to do otherwise to get off the ground, and those claims are mandated by Catholic doctrine 
and accepted by the Banezian. The Banezian needs to account for how it is possible that a 
creature can do otherwise in the special case when God moves the creature to act through grace. 
Specifically, what grounds the truth of the claim that, even when God determines human free 
choices from eternity such that a human being has only one course of action open to them, those 
human beings are morally responsible for their actions?9 If the Banezian view entails that human 
beings, acting under grace, strictly lack any ability to do otherwise, then the view is incoherent. 
I am characterizing the ‘ability to do otherwise’ in a very broad way because the most 
prominent strategy for the Banezian involves affirming that humans have an ‘ability to do 
otherwise,’ even under the influence of God’s efficacious grace, but that this ability to do 
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otherwise does not involve having alternative possibilities; this strategy was (in)famously 
endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.10 I will take Taylor O’Neil’s recent Grace, 
Predestination, and the Permission of Sin as an exemplar of this line of argument, what I’ll term 
the ‘Garrigou Manoeuvre.’ The Manoeuvre is presented within the context of a theodicy, aiming 
to vindicate God from being the author of sin while presenting a certain picture of how God 
causes our free acts under grace.11  But the theodicy is not central to my concerns. What I show 
is that, even if it were true that freedom does not require alternative possibilities, the Garrigou 
Manoeuvre is incoherent. Surprisingly, the Manoeuvre is only successful if Molinism were true. 
The Garrigou Manoeuvre cannot account for the ability of the creature to avoid sin (or resist 
grace) unless it helps itself implicitly to Molinist counter-factuals of freedom. If Banezianism is 
to successfully overcome its own version of the grounding problem, the Garrigou Manoeuvre is 
not the way to do so. I will conclude by suggesting that Banezianism need not be compatibilist, 
and that the versions of Banezianism that are not compatibilist will be able to resolve this 
grounding problem.  
1. The Garrigou Manoeuvre 
O’Neil sets out to defend the coherence of the Banezian position, which holds that God exercises 
a real causal influence on the human will through giving them grace, moving them to enter into 
union with Himself, even though human beings remain free in some strong sense compatible 
with Catholic dogma on the question. God acts causally to move someone to enter into union 
with Himself, but this encompasses more than just the initial act of having faith in and loving 
God that is called ‘justification’; indeed, for the Banezian, God must give the help of His grace at 
any time a created person does anything supernaturally meritorious, where that is some good act 
not possible merely given the natural powers of the creature’s will.12 At times, however, it is 
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easier to focus on the initial justification, and so I will often more simply refer merely to cases of 
free created persons entering into union with God.  
The Banezian, further, requires a distinction between two ways God operates on human 
beings. What they call ‘efficacious’ grace is that causal help from God in virtue of which I 
actually do something supernaturally meritorious.13 This technical language of ‘in virtue of 
which’ is intended to mirror the Banezian claim that, even though I always act if God so causes 
me to act, God does not thereby render my actions necessary, i.e., ‘necessitate’ my acts.14 When 
God gives me only power to do such a good action, such that it is within my free control to 
cooperate with God’s offer to enter into union with Him or reject His offer, that is instead 
‘sufficient’ grace. Given that doing something supernaturally meritorious is conceived by the 
Banezian as activating a power, every time one is given an efficacious grace to act, one is also 
being given or has been previously given by God the sufficient power (i.e., sufficient grace) to 
act. These distinctions were all attributed to Thomas Aquinas, as the foremost defenders of the 
theory claimed to be offering interpretations of Aquinas’ texts on grace and predestination, but it 
is unimportant for my purposes whether they were correct in doing so.15 Similarly, while the 
Banezian camp admits of dissenting voices and many historical twists and turns in defining these 
terms, I will bracket these and focus on Garrigou-Lagrange’s own formulation of the position, as 
his is the target of my criticisms.  
The Banezian theory has been attacked on multiple fronts, not limited to attacks its 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of God’s causality and human free choice.16 A 
famous debate occurred historically on this question, the De Auxiliis controversy from 1580-
1607, with the aforementioned Molinist and Banezian positions as what dominated the 
discussions.17 O’Neil also criticizes the works of other Thomists, such as Francisco Marin-Sola, 
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Jacques Maritain, Jean-Herve Nicholas, and Bernard Lonergan, who each attempted in the last 
century to revise the metaphysics or other elements of the classical Banezian theory. I will not 
defend or discuss any of these other versions of Banezianism, but rather focus on O’Neil’s 
defense of Garrigou-Lagrange’s version. In particular, I am not concerned with the metaphysics 
or details of Garrigou-Lagrange’s account of how predestination occurs, which are highly 
technical. Instead, I am interested in the way that Garrigou-Lagrange’s responds to the worries 
about the fact his theory seems to entail that humans cannot avoid committing sin, if God 
chooses not to grant them efficacious grace, and O’Neil’s defense of his responses. This strategy 
for defending Banezianism is what I am calling the ‘Garrigou Manoeuvre.’   
First, the objection and the account. Garrigou-Lagrange took himself to be doing nothing 
more than working out the implications of the traditional Banezian account of grace and 
predestination. The primary question for the Banezian in general, as for Garrigou-Lagrange in 
particular, is this: in virtue of what does God give, or not give, some free person efficacious 
grace? The Banezian cannot say that there are truths about what the person would do, as the 
Molinist can, and thus (for example) cannot claim that God would move someone to supernatural 
action only if He knew that they would freely consent to it. This is so, according to Banezianism, 
because there are no truths about what a created person would do apart from God’s choices about 
whether to give that person the requisite efficacious grace or not. Creaturely freedom is product 
of God’s causal activity, not something independent of it. Conversely, if there is nothing in virtue 
of which God gives efficacious grace to people – if God does so at His own good pleasure – then 
it seems like God would be arbitrary (and probably even unjust18). Thus, the natural question for 
the Banezian is: how there can be something in control of the free creature that makes God 
responsive to them, but which is not independent of God’s causal activity?  Garrigou-Lagrange 
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claims that there is something in virtue of which God denies someone efficacious grace, and that 
this is in the control of the sinner: a person “is deprived of efficacious grace because by sinning 
he resists sufficient grace . . . [Therefore,] God refuses efficacious grace only to one who resists 
sufficient grace; otherwise there would be an injustice involved.”19  
But Garrigou-Lagrange also endorses claims that seem to make his explanation circular. On 
one hand, his metaphysics requires that any act that would precede God’s giving efficacious 
grace would require God’s efficacious grace to perform. Thus, he would rule out the idea that 
someone could prepare themselves, by some prayer or other interior act, to ask God to give them 
efficacious grace, without already (by the very fact of doing this preceding action!) having been 
given that grace. Further, while he claims that “man does not sin on account of insufficient help 
or any divine neglect, but because of his own deficiency,”20 Garrigou-Lagrange also claims that 
everyone always is deficient, resists God through sin, apart from efficacious grace.21 If God 
chooses not to give me efficacious grace, then it is impossible that I ever act in a way that does 
not resist God’s offer of entering into union with me (i.e., sufficient grace). But then it seems 
that, if God decides to not give someone efficacious grace, and that person can do nothing 
independent of and prior to God’s decisions to cause or impede God from giving that grace, the 
vindication Garrigou-Lagrange offers is apparently viciously circular: God denied me efficacious 
grace because I resisted sufficient grace, but I resisted sufficient grace in virtue of God’s 
withholding efficacious grace from me.  
Garrigou-Lagrange attempts to address this apparent circularity in two ways. One strategy 
involves interpreting this ‘in virtue of’ clause as mere permission rather than casual interference 
(and I will take this to be the central, explanatory move). However, O’Neil focuses on another 
strategy that involves what Garrigou-Lagrange calls the ‘principle of predilection’: “no man 
10 
 
would be better than another if he were not loved more by God.”22 On this second strategy, the 
Garrigou Manoeuvre ends in saying that why some receive efficacious grace and others do not 
ultimately rests only on God’s loving some people more than others – there is no further 
explanation.  
O’Neil tries to dispel the feeling of unease with the Garrigou Manoeuvre, first, by arguing 
that while it is particularly true of “any variants of the Dominican Thomistic treatment that posit 
the principle of predilection…[that these] cannot escape the inherent mystery of why God 
chooses one rather than another,”23 the problem is also true of any view which holds that God 
elects some to glory by His free graciousness. All such are committed to the mysterious 
consequence that: “It is well within God’s power to move each man to his supernatural end 
infallibly, and yet he does not do so….”24 For example, even on Molinism, there is the mystery 
why God permitted Judas to exist in circumstances where God knew that Judas would inevitably 
sin, despite God being able to put Judas in circumstances where Judas would not have sinned 
(and knowing that there were such circumstances, viz. His middle knowledge).  
a. Dissecting the Manoeuvre 
One does not need to reject the underlying Thomistic metaphysics that God is the source of all 
goodness to find that second strategy for resolving the circularity in Garrigou-Lagrange’s 
explanation of grace unsatisfying. Here I object not so much from intuitions about God’s justice, 
but rather because the principle of predilection is ultimately satisfactory if and only if the first of 
Garrigou-Lagrange’s strategies for resolving the account’s circularity is coherent. That is, what 
the Garrigou Manoeuvre needs to account for is what makes it the case that the creature has a 
power to cooperate with or resist God’s grace, even if it has no alternative possibilities. Only 
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then does it make sense to say that, if the creature has such a power, God’s love of some 
creatures more than others does not undermine their moral responsibility. Naturally, Garrigou-
Lagrange has an answer to this question (which involves appeal to a power). But, first, we need 
to clearly state that the ‘principle of predilection’ is a distraction from what is explanatorily 
central. 
To see this, consider that O’Neil is arguing is that God is under no obligation to save 
everyone. This can be granted without conceding that it would be acceptable for God to place 
creatures in circumstances where, independent of their free choices, they are unable to avoid 
sinning. The central question is then: in virtue of what are humans responsible for their actions, if 
God so restricts (from eternity) the course of actions open to them, so that some lack any 
alternative possibilities for acting otherwise? This is particularly pressing in the case of God 
denying efficacious grace to a person, where that person (as a consequence) in no possible world 
can avoid sinning. O’Neil’s response is that God’s reprobation, His permission for someone to 
go to hell, is a non-act on God’s part. Rather than exerting a “positive influence, or a causal 
exclusion” that makes one unable to do a good act, God’s permission of sin is “a non-act, a 
nothing, a not-giving of something gratuitous, that is, upholding the creature from rejecting God 
and dying in such a state [of mortal sin].”25 Consequently, O’Neil concludes, God is not 
responsible for causing the sinner to go to hell.  
However, the fact that God’s permission is not a ‘positive act’ would not by itself be 
sufficient to show that He is not responsible for the sinner’s sin. My failing to save a drowning 
child from the well is a non-act, but one in which I am morally culpable for my non-action – 
technically, a ‘sin of omission.’ We have to be careful about framing such a worry, however, as 
such sins of omission require that I have failed to fulfill a moral duty. For some Thomists (such 
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as Brian Davies), God has no moral duties or obligations toward His creation.26 It is possible to 
put to one side this controversial claim about God’s lack of moral obligations, however, as the 
worry can be put without appeal to any of God’s moral obligations. O’Neil’s defense requires a 
stronger claim: that God giving a creature the possibility not to sin is gratuitous, so that God can 
still hold a creature responsible for their sins even though they lacked any alternative possibilities 
that were not sinful. But we still have to disambiguate this claim. The claim could be, either, that 
creatures are themselves responsible for being in the situations where they lack non-sinful 
alternatives; God is not responsible for the actions of creatures in these situations, and His grace 
saves them from themselves. Or, alternatively, we might say that I am free even when I lack 
alternative possibilities for action, as long as the possibilities that I do have open to me are 
relevantly in my control.  
The question of alternative possibilities is controversial, as I will explain below, but we need 
to step back for a moment. Recall that, on Molinism, the truths about what I would do in certain 
counter-factual situations are true in virtue of something independent of God’s choices (whether 
God’s essence or my essence). For example, the Molinist thinks it is a fact that Peter would 
repent of betraying His Lord if Peter was put in exactly the circumstances the apostle Peter 
historically occupied, but that God knows of other circumstances on which Peter would not have 
repented. This is a metaphysical fact independent of God’s choice to create Peter – even if Peter 
never existed, God would still know what Peter would have done when the cock crowed thrice. 
For Banezianism, by contrast, truths about what I do are all true in virtue of God’s choices about 
me. For example, Peter’s decisions are known by God because all those actions are present to 
God in His eternal perspective on time.27 God did not create Peter so that Peter would inevitably 
repent of his betrayal by internal necessity.  Instead, in the same ‘logical moment’ that God 
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chose to create Peter, God can be imagined to thereby have chosen to create all of Peter’s other 
actions because, even though Peter comes to exist and act at definite points in time, those acts are 
all present to God in eternity. If God never created Peter, there would be no actions of Peter for 
God to ‘see’ from eternity and no truths about whether Peter would betray Christ. For this 
reason, the Banezian would deny that there are counter-factuals of freedom for my actions that 
are independent of God’s will.  
Even more strongly, though, the Banezian claims that God’s choices about whether to give 
efficacious grace will make true whether a person acts a certain way (e.g., whether Peter repents 
of his betrayal). This is the claim, central to the theory, that God’s grace is intrinsically 
efficacious. There are therefore no truths about whether a person would or would not cooperate 
with God’s grace independent or prior to God’s decision to give or withhold that grace – all the 
truths about Peter repenting, or not, are made true by God’s decisions to give Peter grace or not.  
I am here using the phrase ‘independent of and prior to,’ and its correlative ‘subsequent to,’ 
in a loose manner to indicate a logical (not temporal) order in God’s choices or intentions. My 
decision to get my car keys, for example, is logically subsequent as well as temporally 
subsequent to my decision to go for a drive. For God, of course, there are no temporal ‘befores’ 
or ‘afters’ in His decision making, just as there are presumably no separate acts of decision. 
Nevertheless, there is a logical order: God’s decision to create Adam’s human heart would be a 
decision that is logically posterior to His decision to create Adam, a human being, because (we 
can imagine) God created the heart to serve a particular function in Adam’s human body. His 
decision to create that heart in Adam’s case was not ‘independent of’ His decision to create a 
human being. By contrast, we might imagine His decision to create human beings was prior to 
and independent of His decision to become incarnate as a human being.28  
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Nevertheless, the Banezian claims that my actions are not simply necessitated by God. A 
classical distinction was drawn between what I actually do under influence of God’s grace,  
where I necessarily only can perform one act, and what I nevertheless could have done at that 
very same moment, such that I could have done otherwise than what I actually did (viz. the 
sensus compositus/divisus).29 For the Manoeuvre to work, too, it cannot be the case that creatures 
are responsible for being in the situations where they lack non-sinful alternatives. Instead, God’s 
permission of sin, or decision to give efficacious grace, is what puts the creature in the modal 
neighborhood where they have (respectively) the possibilities that they do. The decision to 
permit a creature to sin is made from eternity, not as ‘foreseeing’ what a creature does in time or 
what the creature would do in a counter-factual situation, and as inevitably restricting that 
creature’s alternative possibilities, even if it is a non-act. If the Garrigou Manoeuvre works, then, 
it does so only because God’s choice to restrict a creature’s alternative possibilities in this way 
does not undermine that creature’s moral responsibility.  
The central claim of the Garrigou Manoeuvre is, then, something like this: that it is sufficient 
for my being free that I have the relevant capacities for free action, even if I never actualize them 
to choose an action that is not sinful. The story of how I sin, then, is this one: all God does is 
know that I inevitably will commit sin without His help (perhaps in all nearby modal worlds). He 
is under no obligation to save me from myself, and so Him leaving me without efficacious grace 
does not make Him responsible for my sins. God does not take away or impede my normally-
functioning capacities for choice when I sin. To the contrary, when I sin, I act fully from my own 
capacities and volitions; God has only refrained from miraculously intervening in those normal 
processes in such a way as to stop me from doing what I want to do. And that, surely, cannot be 
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something prejudicial to my freedom. Similarly, God is not responsible for what I do, even if He 
decides from eternity that He will not miraculously intervene to save me from myself.  
On my rendering, then, we can state the Manoeuvre in a way that does not require any 
position on whether alternative possibilities are necessary for freedom. And this is pace the 
infelicitous claims sometimes made by O’Neil and Garrigou-Lagrange. They sometimes reason 
that, if it was truly impossible for me to act in such a way as to avoid sinning, I would not be 
responsible for these sinful actions because I would lack the relevant alternative possibilities. For 
example, if God were to make it that I could not do what the moral law commands, then O’Neil 
concedes that “it would do away with the real possibility for me to uphold the divine laws of 
God. God would command something that was impossible….”30 As I will show, this is not quite 
the right way to put the matter.  
Nevertheless, there is a serious problem with the Garrigou Manoeuvre even on this rendering 
– and without appeal to the way that God’s efficacious grace seems to cut off alternative 
possibilities – it is the case that the Garrigou Manoeuvre is incoherent. Simply put, I will argue 
that the Manoeuvre works only if Molinism is true. But, by stipulation of the Manoeuvre, 
Molinism is false. If there are no counter-factuals of freedom, as the Manoeuvre claims, then the 
Manoeuvre cannot appeal to such counter-factuals – yet it, in fact, does appeal to counter-
factuals of freedom. This problem for the Manoeuvre is fatal.  
b. The Problem with the Manoeuvre’s Story of Sin 
The Manoeuvre’s story of sin, as I’ve given it earlier, relied on an intuition that God leaving me 
without efficacious grace does not make Him responsible for my sins, because God does not take 
away or impede my normally-functioning capacities for choice when He does so. What I do 
16 
 
without His grace are my acts, even if there is no world where I use my capacities well. God 
doesn’t need to save me from myself, although He certainly can. But the story requires an 
assumption: that there are truths about what my capacities permit me to do, independent of or 
prior to whether God has decided to give me efficacious grace or not. This is not to say that I can 
do things absent the divine motion, which all Banezians deny, but that there are truths about my 
capacities, prior to and independent of God’s efficacious grace. These facts about my capacities 
are what are supposed to explain why it is true that I could have done otherwise even at the very 
moment that God is causing me to perform some particular action.31  
The assumption initially appears Molinist (and I think the actual Garrigou-Manoeuvre makes 
use of this Molinist sense). This makes a significant difference because, for the Garrigou 
Manoeuvre to preserve the responsibility of creatures for their sins, there have to be counter-
factuals of freedom that God knows independently of His decision to create that creature and to 
give them efficacious grace. But, if Banezianism is true, there are no such truths. Instead, the 
truths about whether I cooperate with God’s grace are all made true by God’s decision to give 
me efficacious grace. Consequently, God’s decision to permit me to sin, to not give me 
efficacious grace, would be what makes it true that I have no possibilities for non-sinful action. If 
the assumption is not read as Molinist, the Banezian will have a serious grounding problem such 
that the view is incoherent.   
Let’s step back for a moment to disambiguate the assumption from other nearby claims. 
There is a claim that plausibly follows from the Christian doctrine of original sin: for any human 
being that exists post-Fall, that human being will inevitably act sinfully at some time if God does 
not intervene.32 Further, as we already saw in setting up the problem of grace and freedom, the 
Catholic tradition requires: a human being cannot do any supernaturally good act unless God 
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intervenes to assist in production of that act.33 One could imagine that the Manoeuvre intends to 
merely reproduce these claims in order to ground its claim that there are truths regarding whether 
I would or would not cooperate with God’s grace, prior to God’s decision to give me efficacious 
grace. Specifically, these claims seem clearly to entail that I would not cooperate with God’s 
grace absent God’s intervention. Thus, the Manoeuvre does not require Molinism to be true in 
order to claim that there are truths about what I would do in the relevant situation – all that need 
be true are these Catholic claims about original sin and grace.  
Nevertheless, these claims do not actually help; rather, the Garrigou Manoeuvre needs more. 
The Manoeuvre presumes that another Christian doctrine is true: the Catholic tradition also 
claims that God intends to help all – He desires that all be saved.34 For the Banezian, this is 
translated into the claim that God gives every human being sufficient grace to produce a good 
act, even if they never cooperate with God’s grace to do so.35 Because this is true, then the story 
of sin cannot be complete without making it clear that the person is culpable of sin only when 
they are given the opportunity by God to cooperate with His offer of salvation. That is, the 
relevant moment for the sinner needs to be subsequent to God’s decision to give sufficient grace 
to the sinner, but before we know whether God gives that sinner efficacious grace or not.  
So, the story of sin can be filled in like this: God does not take away or impede my normally-
functioning capacities for choice when I sin, nor does He take away the power He has given me 
to avoid sinning, i.e., sufficient grace. This is because God merely knows that I inevitably will 
reject His offer of help, the sufficient grace to avoid sinning, and so that I would always commit 
sin without His help (in all, or all relevant, modal worlds36). Then, God is under no obligation to 
save me from myself, from what He knows I would do with that sufficient grace, and so Him 
leaving me without efficacious grace does not make Him responsible for my sins. But this is to 
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say that there are truths about what I would do subsequent to God’s offer of sufficient grace, but 
prior to His decision to give efficacious grace or withhold it. And these truths are not merely 
truths relevant to Catholic doctrines of grace or original sin, where it would be inevitable that I 
commit sin without God’s help, but in the context of God’s having made an offer of help, i.e., 
sufficient grace, and so a different context where it is no longer inevitable that I commit sin.  
Notice that the doctrine of original sin does not claim that I will inevitably sin even after 
being offered sufficient grace to avoid sin. Instead, it seems plausible that, if sufficient grace is a 
power, then, subsequent to being given sufficient grace, there are possible worlds where I do not 
sin. For example, if God chooses to give me efficacious grace as well as sufficient grace, then 
there is a world where I choose to cooperate with that sufficient grace and actually avoid sinning, 
and it is false that I inevitably sin after being given sufficient grace. The problem is Banezianism 
by itself can only support such a claim that God knows that I would inevitably sin, after being 
given sufficient grace, with the proviso that, if God did not grant the creature efficacious grace, 
we know with certainty that the creature can do no good and would sin without that efficacious 
help.37 But that’s not ultimately to the point. The Manoeuvre needs it to be true, prior to or 
independent of whether God has chosen to give me efficacious grace, that it is always the case 
that I will inevitably use God’s sufficient grace badly, in order to argue that God is under no 
obligation to save me from what I would have done if God had not intervened. But this is clearly 
a Molinist assumption, a counter-factual claim about what I would have done that is not made 
true by any decision of God’s about whether to give efficacious grace or not.  
Similarly, then, facts about my acts proceeding from my rational or volitional capacities are 
beside the point. Perhaps we might think that alternative possibilities are not required for 
freedom. A slide between lack of alternative possibilities for action and lack of responsibility is 
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not obviously justified, even on a libertarian account of freedom. The theological counter-
example is obvious: God cannot sin, just as the saints in heaven cannot sin. It is conceivable that 
both are nevertheless free, even if they lack alternative possibilities that allow them to sin. Even 
if I lacked alternative possibilities, it might be the case that we have some theory that, as long as 
I was responsible for the possibilities I did have open to me, or was otherwise the ‘ultimate 
cause’ of my own acts (on some theory of what that requires), I can still be acting freely.38 But 
this kind of theory is irrelevant for the Manoeuvre’s explanation as to how God is not responsible 
for sins.  
The critical point is that God has to ‘merely know’ that I inevitably will reject His offer of 
help to avoid sin, in order to give sense to the claim that God merely permits that to occur – God 
is then under no obligation to save me from my own bad choices. But, if there are only truths 
about what I would do without God’s help subsequent to God making a decision to withhold 
efficacious grace, as Banezianism holds, then that my actions proceed properly from my 
intellectual or volitional faculties, or that I am the ultimate cause of my own actions (or whatever 
such theory we might hold in place of a requirement that I have alternative possibilities for 
action), would not by itself be enough to determine what I would or would not do in some such 
situation. We would need further facts about what God chooses to do, namely, whether God has 
chosen to give me efficacious grace or not, to say what I would do in these situations. However, 
the Manoeuvre is only explanatory if it can pose a clear distinction between God permitting and 
causing me to sin. And this apparently requires that we can know what I would do independent 
and prior to God’s decisions whether to give me efficacious grace or not.  
c. The Dilemma for the Manoeuvre in a Nutshell 
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Clearly, Banezianism is not the view that God decides to give efficacious grace after sufficient 
grace because of an act of cooperation or rejection that I perform independent of his decree, 
which He foresees me performing. Why then think that the Garrigou Manoeuvre requires that 
God know these Molinist-esque counter-factuals? The dilemma is that there is an instability in 
the Garrigou Manoeuvre between its explicit account of why God decides to give efficacious 
grace, where the view is clear in rejecting counter-factuals of freedom, and its claims about what 
grounds attributions of moral responsibility to the creature, subsequent to God’s decision to give 
them efficacious grace.  
Garrigou-Lagrange’s version of the story of sin begins in eternity – God has from all eternity 
decreed that He permits me to sin, and knows that I will sin inevitably if He permits it, but has 
not thereby caused me to sin: “God foresees the sin and its beginning in His permissive 
decree . . . if God wills to permit the evil which He is not bound to prevent, that real [antecedent] 
power [to avoid sin] will never be reduced to act. Hence knowing His permissive decree, God 
infallibly recognized the deficiency, though He does not cause it.”39 The idea is not that God first 
foresees my sin and then permits it; instead, the logical order is the other way around: God 
makes a decision to let me sin and then He foresees my (inevitable) actual sin. Yet, Garrigou-
Lagrange tries to draw a distinction between causally intervening and refraining from causally 
intervening. As God is not affecting my normally-functioning capacities, He recognizes that His 
refraining from intervening makes it true that I will sin, before I have done anything to which 
God might be responding and without God having a reason to deny me this intervention. God has 




Consider what happens to the Manoeuvre when we try to remove these counter-factuals from 
Garrigou-Lagrange’s explanation. Banezianism holds that there are no counter-factuals of 
freedom – God’s causality is precisely what makes it that I act a certain way, so that without 
God’s decision there are no truths about what I would do. If there are no truths about what I 
would do in the event that God gave me merely sufficient grace (i.e., what I would do under the 
influence of God’s sufficient grace logically prior to or independent of God’s decision to give 
efficacious grace or withhold it from me) then the whole account of God’s permitting me to act 
on my own powers, and so be responsible for my own sinful acts sans efficacious grace, 
becomes unintelligible. Similarly, the language of God not intervening in the normal or ordinary 
course of my actions seems to presume that there is some such ‘course’ my actions would take if 
He had not intervened.  
It seems reasonable to think there are some grounds for God to know that I would do 
something, prior to and independent of His efficacious grace, in order for the Manoeuvre to be 
able to make the relevant distinctions. If I have no possibilities for acting otherwise except 
logically subsequent to God’s decision to give efficacious grace to me at some time (or not), then 
the Garrigou Manouevre’s story of sin is false. God’s permission for my sin, not giving me 
efficacious grace, is what makes it true that I will commit sin, in all such possible worlds, and 
there is no relevant distinction between God ‘causing’ and God ‘permitting’ me to sin by 
choosing to withhold efficacious grace. Consequently, it would not have been true that I would 
have sinned if God had not intervened, because there were no such truths about what I would 
have done prior to God choosing to intervene or not. God’s decision not to give me efficacious 
grace is what made it true that I would sin. It then seems fairly clear that God’s decision is what 
restricts my alternative possibilities in such a way that I cannot perform any supernatural act – it 
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is not a moral dilemma such as those that I might enter by my own poor choices, but a dilemma 
that God causes me to be in, a situation where it becomes impossible for me to fulfill God’s 
commandments.  
But this sets up the dilemma for the view. On one fork, Garrigou-Lagrange and O’Neil argue 
that I am responsible for my sins because it was true that I was going to sin, even prior to and 
logically independent of God’s choice not to give me efficacious grace, and so He is under no 
obligation to save me from myself. The Garrigou Manoeuvre’s the story of sin would then claim 
that God merely knows that I will always freely choose to sin in all worlds where He gives me 
sufficient grace to avoid sinning, despite the fact that God had given me sufficient grace so that I 
had non-sinful alternative possibilities open to me. But if there are counter-factuals of freedom, 
such as those of what I would do prior to God’s decision to give me grace, Molinism would be 
true and Banezianism false. Thus, on this fork, Banezianism is vindicated as non-compatibilist, 
but at the price of holding that there are counter-factuals of freedom – and so at the price of 
making the Manoeuvre inconsistent, because it would entail the falsity of Banezian claims that 
there are no counter-factuals of freedom.  
On the other fork, the Banezian needs to rescue the claims about what I can do, but without 
appeal to counter-factuals of freedom. We should first note that the Manoeuvre fails to meet 
Garrigou-Lagrange and O’Neil’s own standard that God can only hold me responsible for my sin 
if there were a set of relevant alternative possibilities (or, some possible world) such that it is 
open to me to avoid sinning. If it were true that there are no counter-factuals of freedom, then 
God’s decision to withhold efficacious grace from me is what makes it impossible for me to do 
anything other than sin, because God’s decision cuts off all relevant alternative possibilities 
where I do not sin. I will inevitably sin, and there are no alternative possibilities open to me, in 
23 
 
all those worlds where God does not give me efficacious grace. But, by their own apparent 
account, the facts about my volitional or intellectual faculties, plus God’s sufficient grace given 
to me, are not enough by themselves to ground the existence of even one possible world where I 
can avoid sin. On this reading, where the Garrigou Manoeuvre would require alternative 
possibilities, it would appear flatly false that I can resist God’s grace insofar as there is no 
possible world where I do.   
As noted, however, there is an extensive contemporary literature, sparked by Harry 
Frankfurt, arguing that alternative possibilities are not required for freedom or moral 
responsibility.40 I have suggested that we can make the Manoeuvre more consistent by rejecting 
(O’Neil and Garrigou-Lagrange’s own) appeal to alternative possibilities, instead holding that all 
we need for freedom or moral responsibility is that free actions proceed from a creature’s own 
intellect and will. On this reading, even though it is true that there are no possible worlds where I 
do not sin, logically subsequent to God’s permission of my sin, I am still responsible for any sins 
I commit in virtue of having a properly functioning intellect and will. Unlike the cases 
envisioned by libertarian deniers of the principle of alternative possibilities, I was arguably not 
the ultimate cause of the restricted set of alternative possibilities that I find myself in when God 
chooses from eternity to withhold efficacious grace from me.41 When there are only sinful 
possibilities open to me, and I would find it unthinkable or undesirable to do anything but sin, I 
did not put myself in this position. Instead, it would appear that God was the one who put me in 
this position by choosing to withhold efficacious grace from me from eternity. Even if my 
decision proceeded from my intellect and will, the Banezian account of divine causality appears 
precisely to undercut the claim that I am the ultimate source or cause of my decisions.  
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Consequently, the situation here puts the Garrigou Manoeuvre in the neighborhood of other 
kinds of (what is called) source compatibilism in recent literature, rather than the libertarian 
deniers of the alternative possibilities.42 Obviously, the theological compatibilist wing of 
Banezianism would embrace this position; even if God restricts my possibilities from eternity, 
making it the case that there is no possible world where I avoid sinning, it is nevertheless true 
that I am responsible for my acts of sin because they proceed, e.g., properly from my own 
faculties (insert here another preferred account of what is required for responsibility). Unlike 
typical source compatibilists, the Garrigou Manoeuvre needs to account for how God’s sufficient 
grace figures in me having the power to avoid sin, in addition to my faculties. The Catholic 
doctrine of grace requires that, even if my intellect and will function appropriately, I would not 
have even been able to desire God’s grace without His grace already working in me. On this 
compatibilist reading, then, to say that God is ‘permitting’ me to sin is meaningful because He 
has not interfered with the normal function of my faculties, acting under sufficient grace. The 
Garrigou Manoeuvre also goes beyond typical source compatibilism because it requires God’s 
efficacious grace to be an instance where God is casually intervening in the normal operation of 
those faculties, and where this is compatible with my freedom. Individuating how God’s 
intervention is nevertheless part of or compatible with the proper operation of my own faculties 
will be tricky. 
Those difficulties might not be insuperable, but another is. As noted earlier, the Banezian 
compatibilist holds that facts about my will, intellect, and God’s sufficient grace do not entail 
that there is any possible world where I can avoid sin, nor that these things would entail that 
there is a possible world where I can resist grace when I am acting under efficacious grace. 
What, then, could account for me having such a power either to avoid sinning or to resist God’s 
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efficacious grace? Namely, because I acted from the right process or faculties, operating under 
sufficient grace. However, a typical way for those compatibilists who appeal to a right or proper 
process or faculty to individuate the ‘right’ kind of responsiveness required for freedom is 
through a modal characterization of such processes or faculties. Possession of the relevant 
intellectual and volitional faculties is not enough, for example, for me to be responding to moral 
reasons or acting on reasons. A sleeping person has these faculties, but his/her actions (e.g., 
falling out of bed) do not properly proceed from those faculties, as the agent was not responding 
to reasons in so acting. Instead, the typical construction is that to be responsive to reasons 
involves sensitivity to those reasons. As McKenna puts it, “Different reasons, understood as 
different inputs, would have yielded different outputs, understood as alterations in modes of 
conduct. And what this shows is that the agent’s response to the actual ‘inputs’ played a role that 
was itself sensitive to, or responsive to, the actual conditions in which the agent acted.”43 
  The Banezian compatiblist cannot appeal to a modal characterization of faculties in this 
way, because there are no possible worlds where I can avoid sin, if God chooses to withhold 
efficacious grace, just as there is no possible world where I can resist grace when He decides to 
give me efficacious grace. In such cases, I am modally sensitive not to the reasons for me to act, 
but rather my acts are sensitive only to God’s choices. And other compatibilist strategies by 
appealing to the mechanism by which I acted – my faculties plus sufficient grace – as reasons-
responsive are unhelpful for the same reason: that mechanism is not responsive to reasons, but is 
modally sensitive only to God’s choices.44 The compatibilist Banezian might also try to argue 
that my faculties are like ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ dispositions, where some extraneous factor 
prevents the manifestation of the power. For instance, salt has the power to be soluble (say, on 
account either of its chemical microstructure or its essence) but this power will not manifest, i.e., 
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is ‘masked’, if that salt is encased in wax.45 In the same way, although my faculties plus 
sufficient grace are such that I have the ability to avoid sin in virtue of being able to act on these 
faculties, I can never manifest this power without God’s efficacious grace.46  
In all these cases (as with Frankfurt counter-examples), the question is whether I had the 
power to have chosen or done differently under the circumstances, where the relevant 
circumstances are either prior to and independent of God’s efficacious grace (in avoiding sin), or 
subsequent to efficacious grace (in resisting grace).47 In neither case, though, can the Banezian 
compatibilist account for why possessing and acting on my intellectual/volitional faculties (even 
elevated by God’s sufficient grace) allows for me to have the power to do otherwise, given the 
barren modal landscape – every possible world under either relevant set of circumstances has 
only one set of possibilities. So, none of the options look good for the Banezian compatibilist to 
defend the Garrigou Manoeuvre.  
d. Conclusion 
All that seems left to the compatibilist Banezian is to hold that such a power to do otherwise is a 
brute fact, following upon me possessing certain intellectual/volitional capacities and sufficient 
grace. But this would be to abandon the Manoeuvre, in essence, because the brutality of the 
explanation ramifies upwards and undermines its coherence: to say that my power to do 
otherwise is a brute fact undermines any ground for distinguishing what it means for God to 
permit, rather than to cause me, to sin. (Ironically, too, it would mirror the traditional way that 
Molinists have sometimes responded to their own grounding objection.) For this reason, I 
conclude that the Garrigou Manoeuvre is hopeless without Molinist counter-factuals of freedom. 
Is all hopeless for Banez and his disciples, even if hopeless for Garrigou? Not at all. While I have 
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posed a serious problem for all varieties of Banezian theories of God’s grace, and even if the 
Garrigou Manoeuvre fails to show how Banezianism is not incoherent, there remain alternative 
possibilities open to Banezians.  
Even if it were true that grace is intrinsically efficacious in the way the Banezian envisions, 
and that God chooses from eternity to give efficacious graces only to a subset of all creatures, 
what is needed is some way that God can be responsive to His creatures, without undermining 
God’s causal priority, so that, when God permits His creatures to sin, this need not doom them to 
modal worlds where sin is inevitable. The Banezian cannot appeal to the counter-factuals of 
freedom proposed by Molinism as what makes God’s choices about giving efficacious grace 
responsive to human freedom. Yet there remains logical space in which the Banezian might 
avoid the apparently compatibilist conclusions of their way of understanding God’s causality. In 
particular, there is no reason that the Banezian must be a source compatibilist, even if they are 
driven to deny the principle of alternative possibilities. It is often assumed that God’s 
sovereignty over free will, on the Banezian theory of divine causality, requires that God is totally 
unresponsive to creaturely freedom. Yet, if the Banezian can appeal to how God makes a choice 
to give efficacious grace as accounting for the way in which a creature retains the ability to resist 
God’s grace or avoid sin, there are potential routes for resolving the uniquely Banezian 
grounding problem. But I will leave that exploration for a future paper.  
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